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The current productivity slowdown has stimulated research on the causes of growth. 
We investigate here the proximate determinants of long-term growth in Spain. Over 
the last 170 years output per hour worked raised nearly 24-fold dominating GDP 
growth, while hours worked per person shrank by one-fourth and population trebled. 
Half of labour productivity growth resulted from capital deepening, one-third from 
total factor productivity, and labour quality contributed the rest. In phases of 
acceleration (the 1920s and 1954-85), TFP was labour productivity’s main driver 
complemented by capital deepening. Since Spain’s accession to the European Union 
(1985), labour productivity has sharply decelerated as capital deepening slowed down 
and TFP stagnated. Up to the Global Financial Crisis (2008) GDP growth mainly resulted 
from an increase in hours worked per person and, to a less extent, from sluggish 
labour productivity coming mostly from weak capital deepening. Institutional 
constraints help explain the labour productivity slowdown.  
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Accounting for Growth: Spain, 1850-2019 
The current productivity slowdown in advanced economies has triggered a 
lively debate about its causes. A long phase of robust growth initiated in the aftermath 
of World War II, that brought about unprecedented progress in absolute and per 
capita GDP, has given way to a phase of deceleration in output per hour worked. 
Exploring the origins and drivers of such a vigorous productivity expansion may cast 
some light on the causes of today’s poor performance. Economic history research 
provides an opportunity to expand the exploration beyond the narrow time 
boundaries of modern national accounts. Here, we will investigate growth in Spain 
from a long-term perspective, highlighting phases of fast growth and stagnation and 
exploring its proximate determinants.  
The paper’s aim is, on the one hand, to present consistent estimates of labour 
productivity and its drivers, including new series of capital stock and services, labour 
quality, and total factor productivity, and to describe their long-run trends. On the 
other, to determine how much physical and human capital and efficiency gains have 
contributed to labour productivity enhancement over time and to what extent they 
are complementary.  
Our main findings are that labour productivity (measured as output per hour 
worked) dominated GDP long-run growth, accounting for four-fifths of it, while the 
number of hours worked per person contracted, and population contributed the rest. 
Half of the increase in labour productivity came from capital deepening (that is, capital 
services per hour worked) and one-third from efficiency gains in the use of physical 
and human capital (namely, total factor productivity), while labour quality contributed 
the rest. The progress of labour productivity was not steady. During its phases of 
acceleration (the 1920s and, especially, 1954-85), total factor productivity was its 
driving force, complemented by capital deepening. Since Spain’s accession to the 
European Union, labour productivity has sharply decelerated as capital deepening 
slowed down and TFP stagnated. Sustained GDP growth up to the Global Financial 
Crisis (1986-2007) largely resulted from an increase in hours worked per person and to 
a less extent from labour productivity, whose sluggish growth came mostly from weak 
capital deepening. Institutional constraints help explain the labour productivity 
slowdown.  
 3 
The paper opens by examining GDP growth and looking at its proximate 
determinants: population, hours of work per person, and output per hour worked. A 
breakdown of the hours worked per person is, then, carried out. Next, output per hour 
worked and its proximate sources namely, intensity in the use of production factors 
and efficiency gains, are investigated. In order to do it, we construct long series of 
capital, land, and labour inputs, as well as factor shares in GDP to proxy their output 
elasticities. A discussion of the main trends in labour productivity and its drivers 
follows. A research agenda is suggested in the closing section. 
 
GDP growth and its determinants 
Between 1850 and 2019 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose 55-fold. A 
breakdown of GDP can be carried out using an identity, 
Y = LP * LQ/N * N                        (1) 
being Y, GDP; N, population; LQ, the number of hours worked; and LP (= Y/LQ), GDP 
per hour worked. Note that GDP per head, Y/N, equals LP *LQ/N. 
Over the last 170 years population multiplied 3.2 times, hours worked per 
person shrank by about one-fourth, and output per hour worked raised nearly 24-fold. 
GDP per head gain was lower (17-fold) though, as we have to detract the decline in 
hours worked person from the gains in output per hour worked.  
Logarithmic rates of variation allow us to compare the pace of growth of GDP 
and its components over periods of different length. Thus, being ln the natural 
logarithm,   
ln (Yt/Yt-1) = ln (LPt/LPt-1) + ln ((LQ/N)t/(LQ/N)t-1) + ln (Nt/Nt-1)                      (2) 
Long-term growth in GDP (2.4% per year) appears largely attributable to labour 
productivity gains, that grew at 1.9%, compared to population, at 0.7%, and hours 
worked per person, that shrank at -0.2%.  
Different long swings can be distinguished in which growth deviates from its 
long-run trend as a result of technological change, economic policies, and access to 
international markets (Figure 1).1 Growth rates, measured as average annual 
logarithmic rates of variation, are provided in Table 1. 
                                                      
1 Different phases in GDP growth are defined as deviations from trend estimates with structural breaks. 
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 Moderate growth took place between mid-nineteenth century and the Golden 
Age, with GDP growing at a yearly average rate of 1.5%, to which output per hour 
worked was the largest contributor (0.9%), followed by population (0.6%), while hours 
worked per person contracted mildly. Then, Spain’s Golden Age (1954-75), witnessed a 
4-fold GDP growth acceleration, almost exclusively attributable to labour productivity 
(5.8% of 6,2% GDP growth), as population expansion was largely offset by the 
reduction in hours worked per person (1% against -0.7%). 
The 1970s oil shocks took place at the time of the transition from General 
Franco’s dictatorship (1939-75) to democracy that culminated with Spain’s accession 
to the European Union (1985). Output per hour worked continued thriving as the 
economic crisis and stabilisation and liberalisation reforms led to the closure of 
inefficient industries sheltered from competition. Labour productivity growth more 
than offset the sharp decline in hours worked per person (-3.8%), allowing mild growth 
in absolute and per capita GDP (2.3% and 1.5%, respectively).  
Fast GDP growth (3.7% yearly) presided from Spain’s EU accession (1985) to the 
eve of the Great Recession (2007). Nearly half of it resulted from an increase in hours 
worked per head, since unemployment fell and new jobs were created, while labour 
productivity only contributed one-third.  
During the Global Financial Crisis (2008-13) GDP shrank with similar intensity to 
that experienced in the Great Depression (1929-33) (-1.4% vs -1.5% per annum), 
second only to the sharp contraction during the Civil War (1936-39). The pace of 
employment destruction was comparable to that of the ‘transition to democracy’ 
decade (1976-85) with hours worked falling at -3.5% yearly (against -3.8%), but labour 
productivity lacked the strong response of the ‘transition’ years (1.6% vs. 5.3% growth 
rate) and was unable to prevent a contraction in absolute and per capita GDP. The 
post-Great Recession recovery (2014-19), in which GDP and per capita GDP grew 
practically at the same pace (as immigrants inflow, the driver of population growth, 
was cut short), resulted mainly for the increase in hours worked per person (2.0% out 
of 2.6% GDP growth rate) leaving the contribution of output per hour worked in a 
paltry 0.5%.   
A pattern can be observed since 1975: output per hour worked and hours 
worked per person exhibit opposite tendencies. Phases of (absolute and per capita) 
 5 
GDP growth acceleration and recovery (1986-2007 and 2014-19) went hand-in-hand 
with rising hours worked per person through employment creation, while labour 
productivity growth slowed down. Conversely, phases of sluggish or negative (absolute 
and per capita) GDP growth and employment destruction (1976-85 and 2008-13) 
coincided with those of labour productivity acceleration. Thus, it can be concluded that 
since the mid-1970s the Spanish economy has been unable to combine employment 
creation and labour productivity growth. This is consistent with the fact that expanding 
sectors that created more jobs (construction and services) had lower labour 
productivity relative to industry and experienced slower output per hour growth 
(Prados de la Escosura, 2017), which implies that they were less successful in attracting 
investment and technological innovation. 
This paradox leads us to explore what underlies the behaviour of hours worked 
per person and output per hour worked. 
We can break down the evolution of the number of hours worked per person 
(LQ/N) as follows,  
 (LQ/N) = (LQ/LF) * (LF/WN) * (WN/N)                 (3) 
being (LQ/LF) the hours per full-time equivalent worker; (LF/WN), the ratio of full-time 
equivalent workers to the working age population (those age 15 to 64), that is, the 
participation rate; and (WN/N), the share of the working age population in total 
population.   
Thus, in rates of variation, 
ln ((LQ/N)t/(LQ/N)t-1) = ln ((LQ/LF)t/((LQ/LF)t-1) + ln ((LF/WN)t/(L/WN)t-1) +  
ln ((WN/N)t/(WN/N)t-1)                                                     (4) 
The change in hours per full-time equivalent worker (LQ/LF), which fell from 
2,800 hours by mid-nineteenth century to less than 1,900 hours in the early twentieth-
first century, represents the main driver of hours worked per person in the long run 
(Table 2). Its contribution is especially noticeable during phases of industrialization and 
urbanization in the early 20th century-in which the eight hours per day standard was 
gradually adopted- and the Golden Age (1954-75). It also contributed during phases of 
labour market adjustment and union activism such as the II Republic (1931-36) and the 
‘transition to democracy’ decade (1976-85). 
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The participation rate (LF/WN) also made a substantial contribution to the 
hours worked per person. During the Civil War (1936-39) it accounted for its entire 
decline, while in the 1950s mitigated its fall. Since 1975, the participation rate became 
its main driver. Thus, LF/WN accounts for two-thirds of the contraction in hours 
worked per head during the ‘transition’ decade (1976-85) and for practically all its 
reduction during the Great Recession (2008-13). In both cases, its decline was due to a 
dramatic surge in unemployment. In the ‘transition’ decade, its fall largely resulted 
from the impact of the oil shocks and the exposure to international competition on 
industrial sectors traditionally sheltered from competition, plus the return of migrants 
from western Europe. Conversely, from Spain’s EU accession (1985) up to the Global 
Financial Crisis (2008), the increase in (LF/WN) was the main contributor to the 
increase in the number of hours worked per person, helped by rising female 
participation and the post-1990 inflow of migrants. Again, the rise in the participation 
rate, as unemployment gradually declined, has been a main actor in the aftermath of 
the Great Recession.  
Lastly, the share of those in working age over total population (WN/N) 
increased during the 1930s and 1940s  and, again, between 1976 and 2007, as the 
dependency rate (the children and elderly over working age population) fell, and 
represented a demographic bonus, preventing further decline in the number of hours 
worked per person during the 1930s and 1976-85, and becoming its main driver in the 
1940s. 
What does explain the evolution of output per hour worked? A growth 
accounting framework allows us to breakdown labour productivity between the 
contribution of factor intensity (physical and human capital and land per hour worked) 
and multifactor, total factor productivity that includes “changes in efficiency in the use 
of those inputs and changes in technology” (Bosworth and Collins, 2003: 114). 
Labour productivity (LP) can be decomposed as,  
LPt = A (KSt/LQt)α (Xt/LQt)β (LIt/LQt)γ        (5) 
being LP labour productivity; KS, a volume index of capital services; Xt, land input; LI, 
labour input; and LQ, the quantity of labour (hours worked); A, total factor 
productivity; and α, β, and γ output elasticities to each factor of production. 
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Thus, to disentangle the proximate determinants of labour productivity we 
require volume series of capital, land, and labour inputs. 
 
Factors of production 
Labour Input   
The labour input is the flow of services the labour force provides to production. 
To compute it we start from an estimate of the labour quantity expressed as hours 
worked.2 The data for the main sectors (agriculture, forestry, and fishing, industry 
construction, and services) come from Prados de la Escosura (2017, updated to 2019). 
For the period 1850-1994, the number of hours worked is derived by allocating 
workers and days worked per occupied in each of the main four sectors to their 
subsectors and, then, multiplying the number of days worked by the average hours 
worked per day in each subsector on the basis of Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 
(2010) estimates. From 1995 onwards the national accounts (CNE10 and CNE15) 
supply the hours worked by subsector.  
Next, we need to allow for quality of the labour force and here we face a choice 
between an income-based approached, pioneered by Jorgenson (1990), and an 
education-based approach inspired by Mincer (1958).  
In the income-based approach a labour input index results of weighting the 
hours worked by each category of workers within each branch of economic activity by 
their share in total nominal labour earnings. The rationale is that relative wages 
capture the relative productivity of workers with different attributes and, thus, any 
returns per worker above those received by the unskilled worker represent returns to 
worker’s skills (human capital). However, this approach assumes a fully competitive 
economy and not complying with this assumption may result in upwards biased 
estimates. 
Returns to each type of worker have been taken from Prados de la Escosura 
and Rosés (2010) up to 1984.3 From then onwards, national accounts provide average 
                                                      
2 Here we go beyond the OECD convention that labour input is represented by the number of hours 
worked. Cf. OECD (2019: 122). 
3 From 1954, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010) distributed workers for each industry into four 
occupational categories (unskilled and skilled operatives, technicians, and managers). 
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returns per employee at a disaggregated sector level although, unfortunately, no 
detailed information is provided by age, sex, and qualification within each industry.4 
This lack of differentiation within the labour force may bias the labour input index. 5 
Returns per occupied have been used to weight total labour (employees and 
self-employed) by branch. No distinction is made between employees and self-
employed in the labour force estimates for the pre-national accounts period, 1850-
1953. However, national accounts distinguish between compensation of employees 
and gross operating surplus and mixed incomes.6 Part of the mixed incomes 
correspond to self-employed compensation. Thus, for the post-1954 years, we have 
estimated self-employed labour returns following the principle of opportunity cost and 
assuming that the self-employed labour cost equals that of the average employee in 
their specific industry.7 
Thus, total labour compensation is obtained as 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡.                               (6) 
being 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 the total labour compensation in period 𝑡𝑡; 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, the compensation of 
employees; 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, the number of employees; and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, total employment (employees plus 
self-employed) in period 𝑡𝑡.  
A Törnqvist index of labour input (LI) is, then, computed, 
ln(LIt/LIt-1) = Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣i,t ln(LQi,t/LQi,t-1)              (7) 
where LQl,t is the quantity of labour (hours worked) in branch i and  𝑣𝑣𝑣i,t = ½ (𝑣𝑣i,t-1+ 𝑣𝑣i,t)  
the two year average share of each branch in total labour compensation (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡), being  
𝑣𝑣i,t = 𝑤𝑤i𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿i𝑡𝑡 / 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡. Then, the labour input index is obtained as the exponential.  
                                                      
4 The number of sectors distinguished is 56 for 1985-1995 and 63 from 1995 onwards. There are no 
significant discrepancies between our results and those in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010) for 
1985-2000. 
5 This implies arbitrarily assuming homogenous quality within each sector. Fortunately, there are no 
significant discrepancies between our results and those in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010) for 
1985-2000. 
6 In order to provide a single employment series from different national accounts benchmark series, we 
followed the splicing procedure (interpolation) used in Prados de la Escosura (2016, 2017).  
7 This has been a commonly used procedure. Cf. Kuznets (1966), Jorgenson (1990), and OECD (2019). In 
using this procedure, the more disaggregated the set of industries for which the exercise is carried out, 
the more accurate the estimate. 
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An index of labour quality (H) that measures the labour input’s composition 
effect, can be derived as the ratio between the labour input and labour quantity 
indices.8 
Ht = LIt/ LQt.              (8) 
Our education-based labour input combines the quantity of labour (hours 
worked) with an estimate of the quality of labour on the basis of school attainment. 
Data on average years of schooling for working age population (15-64 years) derive 
from Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010) up to 2000, who draw on Núñez (2005) 
education attainment estimates, completed for 2000-2010 with Barro and Lee (2013, 
updated) five-year benchmark estimates, linearly interpolated, and UNESCO data, from 
2010 onwards.  
Following Bosworth and Collins (2003) and Lee and Lee (2016) we derived 
labour quality by combining years of schooling with the rate of return of education. 
Rates of return tend to be higher in early phases of development, but decline as 
economies develop. However, since private rates of return overestimate social rates of 
returns, it seems reasonable to adopt low values for the rate of return over time, and a 
7 percent per year of education has been adopted.9 
Thus, EDU = (1+r)s                               (9) 
being r the rate of return and s the average years of schooling.  
Then, the education-based labour input index is derived as the product of the 
labour quantity and labour quality indices.  
An important caveat is that the education approach only considers levels of 
quantitative achievement (number of years of schooling) without any adjustment for 
the quality of education received. It ignores experience, on-the-job training, and 
informal education as well as differences in the rate of return between different types 
of education. It also neglects the fact that education can be pursued as consumption, 
                                                      
8 It could be argued that that as this index captures the employment shift towards sectors with higher 
relative wages, it actually represents an improvement in resource allocation rather than in labour 
quality. We owe this remark to Lorenzo Serrano. In our view, improving factor allocation and labour 
quality are not excluding consequences of the employment shift. 
9 This rate of return matches that obtained Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) for Spain, 2004-2008. See 
the discussion in Collins and Bosworth (2003) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). Prados de la 
Escosura and Rosés (2010) explored alternative rates of return but the results do not differ significantly 
from each other until the late twentieth century. 
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not as investment for production. Furthermore, in early stages of economic 
development labour skills are largely dependent on experience and on-the job training 
while formal education contribute more to labour quality in later phases.10 
A comparison of the alternative labour input indices derived through them 
shows they follow similar although the education-based series exhibit faster growth 
over time (Figure 2). However, if we focus on labour quality substantial differences 
emerge in their evolution (Figure 3). Education-based labour quality accelerated in the 
late 19th century to flatten until the mid-1920s when another spurt took place and, 
after the fall in the aftermath of the Civil War (1936-39), steady growth has taken 
place, and only slowed down during the Great Recession. Conversely, income-based 
labour quality improved moderately until 1920 when accelerated until the eve of the 
Civil War. The post-1950 recovery, that only matched the pre-war level in 1960, gave 
way to an improvement until 1990, although decelerated in the 1980s, and has 
flattened during the last three decades. In a nutshell, the main difference between the 
two approaches’ outcomes is that, in the education-based labour input, labour quality 
makes a substantial contribution since the mid-20th century while, according to the 
income-based labour input, the contribution of labour quality has been significant only 
during the 1920s and early 1930s and between 1950 and the mid-1980s (Table 3). 
A challenge is posed by these opposite trends between the income- and 
education-based labour quality estimates. Which one captures the evolution of human 
capital better? Both the income- and the education-based approaches suffer from 
serious shortcomings. The fully competitive economy assumption in the income-based 
approach, if relaxed, would imply that labour quality is upwards biased in the resulting 
estimates as part of it would simply represent the market power effect of higher 
income members in the labour force. In turn, ignoring experience, informal education, 
and on-the-job training, would bias upwards the growth of education-based estimates 
of labour quality as compulsory and universal formal education (not just primary and 
secondary) has increased the number of years of schooling since mid-20th 
century. Moreover, it could be argued that education is a high income elastic good 
whose consumption demand must have increased substantially over the last thirty 
                                                      
10 Cf. Rosés (1998) for labour quality in mid-19th century Catalan textile industry. 
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years as per capita income doubled since Spain’s accession to the EU (1985), without 
having necessarily a significant impact on the quality of labour.11 Therefore, although 
the actual evolution of labour quality might lie somewhere in between the two 
alternative estimates, it is our conjecture that the income-based approach, though 
possibly downward biased, provides a less distorted picture.12 
Capital Input 
Capital input, or capital services, represents the flow of capital services into 
production (OECD, 2009) and, as a first step to compute a volume index of capital 
services, we need to estimate the capital stock. 
In the construction of net capital stock estimates, the Permanent inventory 
Method (PIM) is used for each asset, cumulating flows of investment, corrected for 
retirement and depreciation. In order to implement the PIM, we require a) investment 
volumes and deflators; b) average service lives; c) depreciation rates; and d) an initial 
benchmark level of capital stock.13 
a) Four different asset types have been distinguished: dwellings, other 
construction, machinery and equipment, and transport equipment.14 Gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) volume series are derived by deflating current values, and 
expressed in 2010 Euro. GFCF value and deflator series come from Prados de la 
Escosura (2017, updated to 2019). It is worth noting that the GFCF deflator series have 
been smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter in order to avoid negative values in the 
unit user costs. The same smoothing procedure has been applied to a general price 
index that, in our case, is the GDP deflator. 
b) As regards average services lives, that is, the length of time that assets are 
retained in the capital stock, a single set for each asset over the entire time span has 
                                                      
11 Labour market rigidities, the quality of education, and over-qualification in terms of formal education 
may also help explain the limited effect of education on the quality of labour. 
12 The contrast between income- and education-based estimates in other countries shows the same 
pattern of lower labour quality growth when the former approach is used. Cf. Prados de la Escosura and 
Rosés (2010). 
13 In this section, we draw on Prados de la Escosura (2020). 
14 Biological resources and intellectual property products have been included under “machinery and 
equipment” as information on these two assets is only available in national accounts since 1980. A 
practice shared by Conference Board (2019). No distinction has been made between ICT and non-ICT 
assets due to dearth of data in national accounts and to our purpose to provide homogeneous long-run 
series. 
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been chosen, as services lives are kept constant for most countries.15 Thus, we 
assigned average service lives of 60 and 40 years to dwellings and other construction, 
respectively, and 15 years to both transport and machinery equipment.16  
c) As for depreciation rates, a declining balance has been preferred, that is, a 
geometric rate, δ = R/T, being T the asset’s average service life and R the chosen 
parameter. Geometric depreciation rates differ across assets but are constant over 
time. Following the US Bureau of Economic Analysis practice (Fraumeni, 1997) we 
opted for Hulten and Wykoff (1981) directly computed depreciation rates and implicit 
R values, 1.65 for transport equipment and machinery and 0.91 for structures. The 
resulting depreciation rates are, thus, 1.52% (dwellings), 2.28% (other construction), 
11.0% (machinery and equipment) and 11.0% (transport equipment), respectively.  
d) In the absence of an initial stock of capital, a functional relationship between 
real GFCF for each of the four types of assets and GDP over 1850-1920 was estimated 
and, assuming that such a relationship is stable over time, volume GFCF series for each 
asset type between 1780 and 1850 were derived with the regression coefficients 
obtained and the available GDP series. Then, the PIM was employed to compute the 
net capital stock for each asset using the average lives and depreciation rates 
described in b) and c). This way, we obtained the initial level for each capital asset type 
in 1850.  
Next, the Net Capital Stock for 1850-2019 was obtained using PIM. If we define 
the net stock at the beginning (B) of the first year, 1850, as W1850,B, net stocks for each 
asset at the of end-year (E) in all consecutive years are, 
WtE = WtB + It – δ(It/2+WtB)                    (10) 
being It, real yearly gross fixed capital formation and δ, the rate of depreciation. 
All stocks are valued at average prices of 2010 and the Net Capital Stock in 2010 Euro 
is obtained by adding them up.17 
                                                      
15 There is no concluding evidence that service lives fall over the long run, as offsetting tendencies are at 
work (OECD, 2009). Maddison (1995) also used fixed average lives for his historical estimates. 
16 These service lives are in line with the average lives for the more detailed breakdown of assets in 
Pérez et al. (2019).  
17 We have made an allowance for the destruction of capital stock resulting from the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-39). Specifically, historical estimates have been adopted for other construction and machinery 
and distributed it at constant yearly rates over 1936-39, while for dwellings and transport equipment 
GFCF series with the PIM captures capital stock destruction well. The resulting figures imply a 4.9% 
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Lastly, productive stock, Kt, was derived by adding investment in the latest 
period to the net capital (wealth) stock18,   
Kt = It/2 + WtB                                          (11)      
The next step is to compute a volume index of capital services as a weighted 
average of productive stock indices by type of asset in which each asset’s share in the 
total current value of capital services are the weights.  
Thus, we needed the unit user cost of capital (or the price for capital services) , 
F0t, for each asset, to multiply it by its productive capital stock, Kk,t, and, then, adding 
up the result for each asset to get the total value of capital services, Ut.  
Capital services have been estimated using an ex-ante exogenous rate of 
return.19 In an ex-ante approach, the rate of return for investment on a given asset 
should be similar to that of alternative investments with comparable risk. The OECD 
Manual (2009) advises to work with real rates of return and real changes in asset 
prices, and suggests a 4% real rate of return.20 
The ex-ante unit user cost, or capital service price, F0t, can be defined as 
F0t = P0k,tB (1+ρ(tB)) [ra* + δ0(1+i(tB)*)- i(tB)*]                                   (12) 
Then, the ex-ante user cost of an asset as, Uk,t = F0t Kk,t.               (13) 
And the total user cost of capital as, Ut = Σk=1 Uk,t.                               (14) 
being P0k,tB the purchase price of a new asset at the beginning (B) of year t; ρ(tB)  the 
rate of change of the price index (GDP deflator) at the beginning (B) of year t; ra* the 
real rate of return (the nominal rate corrected for inflation), 4%, in this case;  i(tB)* the 
real anticipated change in asset prices at beginning (B) of year t;  δ0 the rate of 
                                                      
contraction of the total net capital stock between 1935 and 1939 which, by asset type, represented a 
fall of 2.0% (dwellings), 6.8% (other construction), 13.7% (machinery), and 30.4% (transport equipment).  
18 It is worth noting that while to derive the net capital stock the cumulating flow of investment is 
corrected for retirement and depreciation, in the case of productive capital only efficiency losses are 
detracted. In practical terms, their difference results from the fact that the net capital is valued at the 
end of the year and the productive capital represents the average value in the year. 
19 Although ideally an ex-post endogenous rate of return may be preferable as it equals the value of 
capital services to capital compensation in national income, the use of an ex-post endogenous rate of 
return is very data demanding. It requires a complete coverage of all assets and a distinction between 
market and government sectors, that we cannot meet.  
20 This is close to the average real rate of return of bank deposits in Spain since 1850 (4.5%). Alas, when 
using an ex-ante rate of return the resulting value of capital services does not match capital 
compensation in national income. Cf. Prados de la Escosura (2020). 
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depreciation of a new asset; and  Kk,t the productive capital stock of asset k during 
period t. 
Lastly, the volume of aggregate capital services was computed with a Törnqvist 
index, 
ln(KSk,t/KSk,t-1) = Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣k,t ln(Kk,t/Kk,t-1)               (15) 
where Kk,t is the productive capital stock of asset k and 𝑣𝑣𝑣k,t = ½ ( 𝑣𝑣k,t-1 + 𝑣𝑣k,t,)  the two 
year average share of each asset in total user cost of capital, being 𝑣𝑣k,t = Uk,t/U. Its 
exponential provided the volume index of capital services (VICS). 
The evolution of the productive capital stock and the volume index of capital 
services reflects their different weighting, as the former represents the share of its 
assets in the current value of the total net capital stock and the latter the share of its 
assets in total returns to capital. VICS grows faster as more dynamic assets (machinery 
and transport equipment) are usually those with a shorter service life but higher 
returns. Figure 4 confirms their evolution diverged in the 1920s and early 1930s and, 
again, since the 1970s. 
An index of “capital quality”, or compositional change of the capital input, is 
derived as the ratio between the volume index of capital services, KS, and the capital 
stock, K, 
KQk,t = KSk,t/ Kk,t               (16) 
A sustained increase is observed in the quality of capital, which implies a shift 
towards capital goods with higher unit user costs and, hence, higher marginal 
productivity (Figure 5). It was broken during the Civil War and its autarkic aftermath, 
but intensified during the first third of the 20th century and between the mid-1950s 
and the late 1970s. Since the early 1990s, although at a high level, the quality of capital 
has flattened. 
Capital services have grown at fast but uneven pace over the long run. Different 
phases can be observed (Table 4). Moderate but steady growth during the first seven 
decades considered (2% per year) was followed by an acceleration in the 1920s, nearly 
doubling the rate of growth, and remained vigorous in the early 1930s. After the fall 
associated to the Civil War, gradual recovery presided over the 1940s. From the early 
1950s to the eve of the Great Recession the volume of capital services experienced 
fast growth: nearly 8% per cent per year during the Golden Age (1954-75) and 5% in 
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the next three decades, but was cut short by the Global Financial Crisis (2008) giving 
way to a sharp deceleration. 
Capital ‘quality’, made a non-negligible contribution to capital input growth in 
the central decades of the 19th century, between 1914 and 1935, and during the 
Golden Age. However, it hardly improved after 1976, and especially since Spain’s 
accession to the European Union, a fact that may be associated to the investment 
allocation across economic activities (sectors and firms). 
Capital deepening, namely, the volume of capital services per hour worked, 
increased steadily up to the Civil War, but for its acceleration in the 1920s (Figure 6). 
Strong growth prevailed from the early 1950s to the accession to the EU (1985), with 
singular intensity after 1960. Capital deepening declined afterwards, and only had a 
spurt during the Great Recession.  
Land Input  
According to the OECD Manual (OECD, 2009), only land under dwellings and 
other construction and cultivated land should be considered as sources of capital 
services. Although we assume land under structures to evolve as structures do and are, 
hence, included under capital, we consider agricultural land -a non-produced asset 
that suffers no depreciation-, as an independent factor of production that provides a 
flow of services into production, an established practice in historical studies.21 
Assessing the actual amount of land currently in agricultural use represents a 
challenge and even more difficult is the valuation of land. Lack of annual data on land 
used prior to 1958, has forced us to accept the data at available scattered benchmarks 
and derived yearly figures through interpolation. For 1850-2000, we have used Prados 
de la Escosura and Rosés (2009) estimates, but without any adjustment for the 
agricultural economic cycle, completed from 2000 onwards with data taken from 
official surveys on dry and irrigated land by type of use (Encuesta sobre superficies y 
rendimientos de cultivos en España, ESYRCE). Prices of different types of land for 1931 
                                                      
21 We follow Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009) here. Crafts (2018) and Antràs and Voth (2003) also 
consider land as an independent production factor in their studies of Britain’s Industrial Revolution. In 
growth accounting exercises for nowadays’ developing countries, land is often included separately from 
capital. Cf. Bosworth and Collins (2007).  
 16 
and 1985 are taken from Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009), and those for 2017 
come from Encuesta de Precios de la Tierra. 
A land input index has been obtained weighting hectares of land assigned to 
different types of cultivation over 1850-1931, 1931-2000, and 2000-2019 by their 
average prices in 1931, 1985, and 2017, respectively. The resulting indices have been, 
then, spliced into a single Laspeyres index. 
Land input expanded in the late 19th and early 20th century and after declining 
during the Civil War, recovered in the 1940s. However, hardly any growth is observed 
thereafter and its contraction over 1986-2007 was partly reversed after the Great 
Recession (Table 5). Land input per hour worked exhibits negative growth but for 
1890-1920 and during phases of employment destruction (1976-85 and 2008-13).  
 
Sources of labour productivity growth 
To establish the contribution of each factor of production to aggregate 
productivity growth we need to weight their growth by their output elasticities. Under 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the values of these elasticities 
correspond to factor shares in GDP.22 Although, the Spanish economy was far from 
fully competitive over time, we follow the usual practice (OECD, 2019) and accept this 
oversimplifying assumption, although it will bias our total factor productivity 
estimates.23  
We computed the labour share by dividing total labour compensation (see the 
subsection on labour input above) by GDP at market prices.24 Then, the share of other 
factors, that is, 1 less the labour share, needs to be distributed between capital and 
land. Lack of information on land rents led us to estimate land compensation as a 
residual assuming that the difference between agricultural value added and labour 
                                                      
22 Assuming constant returns to scale for each factor of production we impose output elasticities to add 
up to 1,  α + β + γ = 1. 
23 Were there competitive monopolistic rents, TFP growth obtained under the assumption of perfect 
competition would be biased downwards, as the capital share in GDP –by including competitive 
monopoly profits- would overstate the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Conversely, had the 
aggregate production function increasing returns to scale, TFP growth would be over-exaggerated 
(Young (1995: 648).  
24 Computing the labour share in terms of GDP at market prices implies that net taxes on products and 
imports (taxes minus subsidies) are attributed to capital income. This procedure is used by Conference 
Board (2017: 32).  
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outlays accrued to land property. This estimate provides, however, an upper bound for 
the land share as it assumes no returns to capital in agriculture.25 The share of capital 
was, then, derived as a residual after subtracting labour and land returns from GDP. 
Although, on average, factor shares conform to the stylised fact of two-thirds 
corresponding to labour and one-third to property owners (capital and land), factor 
shares are far from stable over time, contradicting Kaldor’s (1957: 592) stylised fact 
(Figure 7). Labour and capital shares evolved as mirror images. Capital (labour) 
compensation increased (reduced) its contribution to GDP between 1880 and World 
War I and from 1960 onwards, and during a short episode in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, and declined (increased) in the Interwar years (1919-1935) and, again, in the 
late 1950s. 
We can now compute the proximate sources of labour productivity growth 
using a Törnqvist index,  
ln(LPt/LPt-1) = Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣k,t [ln(KSt/Kt-1) - ln(LQt/LQt-1)] +  Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣x,t [ln(Xt/Xt-1) - ln(LQt/LQt-1)] +  
 Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣l,t [ln(LIt/LIt-1) - ln(LQt/LQt-1)] + ln(TFPt/TFPt-1)   (16) 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑣i,t = ½ (𝑣𝑣i,t-1+ 𝑣𝑣i,t)  the two year average share of each factor of production in 
GDP at market prices.  
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is, then, derived as a residual, 
ln(TFPt/TFPt-1) = ln(LPt/LPt-1) – {Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣k,t [ln(KSt/Kt-1) - ln(LQIt/LQt-1)] +  Σ𝑣𝑣𝑣x,t [ln(Xt/Xt-1) 
- ln(LQIt/LQt-1)]}                                                                                              (17) 
and the TFP index is obtained as its exponential. 
Table 6 presents the breakdown of the average logarithmic growth rate of GDP 
per hour worked into the contribution of factor accumulation and efficiency gains 
(total factor productivity) and offers two alternative estimates of TFP growth derived 
with income- and an education-based labour quality series, respectively. Figure 8 
provides the yearly evolution of TFP using both indices. 
Over 1850-2019, capital deepening contributed half the growth of labour 
productivity and efficiency gains about one-third, with the remainder attributable to 
labour quality. A glance at the evolution of labour productivity allows to distinguish 
different phases of growth, three of them with TFP significant contributions. Between 
                                                      
25 Given the sharp drop in the relative size of agriculture in the late twentieth century, the resulting bias 
in our TFP growth estimates should not be large.  
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mid-19th century and World War I a phase of progress from 1850 to the early 1890s 
gave way to another of sluggish performance until 1919. Efficiency gains accounts for 
the growth differential between the two phases. While capital contribution was steady 
during these 70 years, TFP only expanded during 1850-1892, providing half the growth 
of labour productivity (slightly less when education-based labour quality is used in the 
computation).  
The 1920s witnessed a vigorous performance of labour productivity more than 
trebling pre-1890 growth. Capital deepening doubled its pace and contributed one-
third of labour productivity growth. However, TFP was the main driver, with its 
contribution ranging from half to two-thirds of labour productivity growth (depending 
on whether it is derived with income- or education-based labour quality). During the 
1930s, TFP collapse accounted almost exclusively for the decline in labour productivity 
while labour quality had a minor contribution to mitigate its contraction. TFP made 
also the largest contribution to its post-Civil War recovery.  
Output per hour worked grew exceptionally fast during 1954-1985 (5.7%), a 
period that encompasses the Golden Age and the ‘transition to democracy’ decade. 
Efficiency gains contributed nearly half of its growth and physical capital accounted for 
another two-fifths. A closer look reveals that during the Golden Age (1954-1975) TFP 
contributed over half labour productivity growth, and one-third in the ‘transition to 
democracy’ decade, while the contribution of capital deepening rose from over one-
third in the Golden Age to half in the ‘transition’ years.  
Then, between Spain’s accession to the EU (1985) and the eve of the Global 
Financial Crisis (2007) labour productivity growth shrank to less than one-fourth, 
becoming largely extensive, rather than intensive. Capital provided four-fifths of the 
sluggish output per hour growth and TFP contributed less than one-fifth or negatively 
depending on whether it was estimated using income- or education-based labour 
quality. Only in the latter case, labour quality would have complemented capital’s 
contribution. Sluggish labour productivity growth played, thus, a secondary role in a 
long phase of robust (absolute and per capita) GDP growth which was driven by the 
increase in hours worked per person resulting from higher employment.  
The Great Recession (2008-2013) was another episode in which capital drove 
the mild acceleration in labour productivity growth, while TFP growth was negative. 
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However, in the post-2013 recovery, TFP has led the paltry labour productivity growth 
(together with labour quality when it is derived using the education-based approach) 
as the contribution of capital turned negative. Again, it was the increase in hours 
worked per person, as employment recovered, what allowed GDP to rebound after the 
Financial Crisis. 
As human capital is a main factor in narratives of economic growth, the role of 
labour quality in Spain’s long run growth deserves some comments. If we follow the 
education-based approach, labour quality added to labour productivity growth from 
the mid-20th century onwards, and made a significant since Spain’s accession to the 
European Union (1985), representing one-half of physical capital’s contribution. Such 
an optimistic outcome needs to be set against reservations with regard to education 
attainment as a measure of human capital; in particular, its demand as a high-income 
elastic consumption good. The income-based approach, although upwards biased as it 
assumes perfect competition, suggests, instead, that labour quality contributed to 
labour productivity growth during the Golden Age and the ‘transition to democracy’ 
decade, but not thereafter. We find the latter a more persuasive story. 
We have replicated the growth accounting exercise using only two factors of 
production, as it is conventionally done (assuming that the share of capital is 1 less the 
share of labour), in order to provide a robustness test for our results. Figure 9 presents 
the evolution of TFP that results from growth accounting exercises with two and three 
factors of production for both estimates with income- and education-based labour 
quality. Both sets of estimates follow the same pattern but the two-factor estimates 
present a higher level relative to 2010, the benchmark year. This implies slower TFP 
growth, especially until 1960, which results from the fact that capital input, that grows 
much faster than land input, receives a larger weight (as includes the land share in 
GDP) in the growth accounting exercise (Table 7). An implication of this comparison is 
that growth accounting exercises for developing economies that neglect the land 
input, over-exaggerate the share of capital and, hence, underestimate TFP growth.  
How do our results for the evolution of the TFP compare to earlier studies? . 
Figure 10  compares our new estimates, derived with both the income- and education-
based labour quality with those by Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009) for 1850-
2000, derived with income-based labour quality, and Bergeaud et al. (2016), updated 
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estimates, using 2000 as reference.  These two series present a close evolution until 
the last quarter of the 20th century, as they rely on the same sources.26 When 
compared to our new estimates, a similar evolution is observed but faster growth 
during the 1960s and early 1970s that, in the case of Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 
(2009) continues during the ‘transition to democracy’ years. It is also worth 
mentioning that Bergeaud et al. series present a sharp deceleration after 1986 but still 
some progress, unlike the stagnation or negative TFP growth in the rest of the 
estimates. 
Another possible comparison referring to the post-1950 era is provided in 
Figure 11, which presents our new estimates along those provided by the Penn World 
Tables 9.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015, updated) for the post-1954 era, and the Conference 
Board (2019) for 1990-2018. In both cases, TFP is derived using education-based 
labour quality. The Conference Board’s TFP series match closely our own education-
based estimates, while the Penn World Tables series adopt an intermediate position 
between our two set of estimates. Although there noticeable differences in the pace of 
growth, their trends are largely coincidental, with the PWT 9.1 series showing, like our 
estimates with income-based labour quality, sustained TFP growth until 1989 and, 
then, mild but steady decline until 2013, while the Conference Board series stresses 
the post-1990 fall, as do our TFP estimates derived with education-based labour 
quality. 
What does explain the potst-1985 shift from efficiency gains to capital 
deepening as labour productivity’s main driver? The fact that TFP growth halted help 
explain the shift, but why TFP did it?  A convergence hypothesis can be entertained. As 
TFP grew sharply over three decades (Figure 8), Spain got closer to the technological 
frontier and achieving further efficiency gains became more difficult. Furthermore, 
once and for all structural change associated to the shift of resources from sectors of 
low or slow growing productivity to those of high, or fast growing productivity (i.e. 
labour moving from agriculture into manufacturing) had already taken place by the 
                                                      
26 Bergeaud et al. (2016, updated) use GDP from the Maddison Project Dataset (that comes from Prados 
de la Escosura, 2017), investment (up to 1980) and employment (up to 1950) from Prados de la Escosura 
(2003), and hours worked from Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010). For the rest of the years, they 
seem to rely on OECD statistics. They provide no sources and procedures for estimating human capital. 
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time Spain joint the EU. Hence, Spain’s potential for catching up would have been 
exhausted and TFP growth slowed down adjusting to its pace in advanced economies. 
Table 8 compares levels of output per hour worked in 1990 (expressed in 2019 
EKS US dollars) in OECD countries (ranked from top to bottom) to their TFP growth 
rates since 1990 using the Conference Board (2020) dataset. In both periods 
considered, the one of expansion, 1990-2007, and the entire time span 1990-2019, 
Spain had TFP poorest performance, and all countries with higher initial levels of 
output per hour worked than Spain in 1990 exhibit faster TFP growth in both periods. 
Such results reject, therefore, the convergence hypothesis.27  
Alternative explanations have been put forward to explain why during the last 
three decades labour productivity growth has slowed down in Spain and become 
extensive rather than intensive. It has been hypothesised that as resources were re-
allocated towards sectors that attracted less innovation (from traded to non-traded 
sectors, i.e., low skill services and construction) aggregate efficiency declined. 
Specifically, Díaz and Franjo (2016) blame investment in residential structures, 
stimulated by favourable relative prices and subsidies, together with low investment 
specific technical change (ISTC), for the TFP slowdown. Pérez and Benages (2017) 
stress the low investment on intangibles and the excess capacity and limited use of 
their capital by predominant small firms. And Cuadrado et al. (2020) complete the 
picture by pointing to the limited exploitation of new technologies as a result of 
workers’ low skills. The recovery of the share of structures in net capital stock and its 
substantial contribution to total value of capital services in the early 21st century 
support these assertions (Prados de la Escosura, 2020). Moreover, the low ISTC is 
consistent with the deceleration of capital ‘quality’ since 1990 (Figure 5).  
García-Santana et al. (2019) offer a nuanced view of the TFP slowdown in which 
it is allocative inefficiency across firms, rather than across sectors, what accounts for 
it.28 Moreover, they find that government regulation (cronyism) is its ultimate 
                                                      
27 TFP growth rates for Spain computed by Conference Board are close to our estimates using the 
education-based approach to obtain labour quality (which is the approach employed by Conference 
Board),-0.7% and -0.6% for 1990-2007 and 1990-2019, respectively. Nonetheless, TFP growth derived 
with income-based labour quality is -0.1% for each of these periods. 
28 Moral Benito (2018) finds that firms’ high capital deepening during the Great Recession and low 
capital deepening thereafter underlies the TFP contraction during the Great Recession and its rise during 
the economic recovery. 
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determinant. Looking at the context in which this misallocation has taken place 
Gopinath et al. (2015) argue that, by lowering interest rates and encouraging an inflow 
of capital, the adoption of the Euro may have been partly responsible for the allocation 
of capital to less productive firms and, hence, the low TFP growth.  
Furthermore, firms’ low expenditure on research and development and low 
investment in intangible capital which hampers TFP (Corrado et al., 2013) are 
associated to regulatory restrictions to competition in product and factor markets 
(Alonso-Borrego, 2010). Specifically, retail trade regulation, the costs of firm creation, 
lack of flexibility in the labour market, bankruptcy legislation and judicial procedures 




The current productivity slowdown has stimulated research on the causes of 
growth. This paper has explored long-term growth and its proximate sources in Spain. 
We found that labour productivity dominated GDP long-run growth. Half the increase 
in labour productivity came from capital deepening and one-third from efficiency 
gains. In phases of labour productivity acceleration total factor productivity was its 
driving force and a complementarity existed between capital deepening and efficiency 
gains.  
Since the mid-1970s the Spanish economy has been unable to combine 
employment creation and labour productivity growth and capital deepening, a finding 
consistent with the fact that expanding sectors that created more jobs experienced 
slower output per hour growth as were less successful in attracting investment and 
technological innovation. During the ‘transition to democracy’ decade labour 
productivity continued thriving since deep structural change and industrial re-
structuring eliminated sheltered low-productivity industries.  
Labour productivity slowdown only began after Spain’s accession to the 
European Union, associated to deceleration in capital deepening and TFP stagnation. 
GDP growth became extensive largely depending on the increase in hours worked per 
person as employment grew until the Global Financial Crisis. Capital misallocation and 
low investment on intangibles and ISTC affecting negatively capital deepening and TFP 
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growth resulted from obstacles to competition in product and factor markets, 
subsidies, and cronyism.  
Do, then, restrictions to economic freedom, regulation and worsening property 
rights, in particular, help explain the poor labour productivity performance during the 
last three decades? Furthermore, does economic freedom constitute an ultimate 
determinant of capital deepening and TFP growth over the long run? Testing this 
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 Table 1     
 GDP Growth and its Composition, 1850-2019  
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)    
      
 GDP Population Hours worked per head GDP per  hour worked 
1850-2019 2.4 0.7 -0.2 1.9 
     
1850-1872 1.7 0.5 0.2 1.1 
1873-1892 1.3 0.4 -0.3 1.2 
1893-1913 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.6 
1914-1919 0.5 0.8 -0.4 0.1 
1920-1929 4.1 0.9 -0.3 3.5 
1930-1935 0.0 1.5 0.0 -1.6 
1936-1939 -6.6 0.4 -1.0 -5.9 
1940-1945 2.8 0.2 0.4 2.1 
1946-1953 3.4 1.0 0.3 2.1 
1954-1958 5.7 0.8 -0.1 4.9 
1959-1975 6.3 1.1 -0.9 6.1 
1976-1985 2.3 0.7 -3.8 5.3 
1986-2007 3.7 0.7 1.8 1.2 
2008-2013 -1.4 0.5 -3.5 1.6 
2014-2019 2.6 0.2 2.0 0.5 
 
 




 Table 2    
 Growth of Hours Worked per Head and its Composition, 1850-2019 
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)   
     
 Hours worked per head Hours/FTE worker FTE worker/WAN WAN/Population 
1850-2019 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
     
1850-1872 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
1873-1892 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
1893-1913 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
1914-1919 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 
1920-1929 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.1 
1930-1935 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.2 
1936-1939 -1.0 0.0 -1.3 0.2 
1940-1945 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 
1946-1953 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.2 
1954-1958 -0.1 -0.6 0.9 -0.3 
1959-1975 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 
1976-1985 -3.8 -1.6 -2.6 0.4 
1986-2007 1.8 -0.1 1.5 0.3 
2008-2013 -3.5 0.4 -3.4 -0.5 








 Table 3     
 Labour Input Growth , 1850-2019   
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)    
  Income-based  Education-based 
 
Labour 
Quantity Labour Quality Labour Input Labour Quality Labour Input 
1850-2019 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.0 
      
1850-1872 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 
1873-1892 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
1893-1913 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.6 
1914-1919 0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.3 
1920-1929 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.2 0.8 
1930-1935 1.6 1.0 2.6 0.5 2.1 
1936-1939 -0.7 -1.2 -1.9 -0.1 -0.8 
1940-1945 0.7 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 0.3 
1946-1953 1.3 0.1 1.4 0.8 2.1 
1954-1958 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.6 1.3 
1959-1975 0.2 1.3 1.5 0.7 0.9 
1976-1985 -3.1 1.1 -2.0 1.2 -1.9 
1986-2007 2.5 0.2 2.7 1.1 3.6 
2008-2013 -3.0 0.3 -2.7 0.5 -2.5 
2014-2019 2.1 -0.1 2.1 1.0 3.2 
 
  
Sources: See the text.  
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 Table 4    
 Capital Input* Growth, 1850-2019  
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)   
     
 Productive Capital Stock Capital Quality Capital Input Capital Input/hour 
1850-2019 3.0 0.5 3.6 3.1 
     
1850-1872 2.2 0.4 2.6 2.0 
1873-1892 1.9 0.2 2.2 2.1 
1893-1913 2.1 0.3 2.4 1.8 
1914-1919 1.2 0.7 2.0 1.6 
1920-1929 3.0 1.3 4.2 3.6 
1930-1935 2.0 1.1 3.2 1.6 
1936-1939 -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 -1.1 
1940-1945 1.4 -0.3 1.1 0.4 
1946-1953 2.5 0.1 2.6 1.3 
1954-1958 4.6 1.4 6.1 5.3 
1959-1975 6.6 1.7 8.3 8.1 
1976-1985 4.7 0.5 5.2 8.3 
1986-2007 4.6 0.3 4.9 2.5 
2008-2013 2.7 0.0 2.7 5.7 
2014-2019 1.4 0.2 1.6 -0.6 
 
 
Note: * Computed with an ex-ante exogenous rate of return 
 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2020) 
  
 32 
 Table 5  
 Land Input Growth , 1850-2019 
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)  
   
 Land Input Land Input/hour 
1850-2019 0.2 -0.3 
   
1850-1872 0.0 -0.7 
1873-1892 0.1 0.0 
1893-1913 0.9 0.3 
1914-1919 0.6 0.2 
1920-1929 0.4 -0.2 
1930-1935 0.5 -1.1 
1936-1939 -1.4 -0.8 
1940-1945 0.7 0.0 
1946-1953 0.5 -0.8 
1954-1958 0.0 -0.7 
1959-1975 0.1 -0.1 
1976-1985 0.0 3.0 
1986-2007 -0.3 -2.7 
2008-2013 0.1 3.1 
2014-2019 0.5 -1.6 
 
  
Sources: See the text  
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 Table 6       
 Labour Productivity Growth  and its Sources, 1850-2019    
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)      
    Income-based  Education-based 
 GDP/hour worked Land Input/hour Capital Input/hour Labour Quality TFP Labour Quality TFP 
1850-2019 1.9 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.6 
        
1850-1872 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 
1873-1892 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 
1893-1913 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
1914-1919 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 
1920-1929 3.5 0.0 1.2 0.4 1.9 0.1 2.2 
1930-1935 -1.6 -0.1 0.5 0.7 -2.7 0.3 -2.3 
1936-1939 -5.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -4.7 -0.1 -5.5 
1940-1945 2.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 2.2 -0.2 2.2 
1946-1953 2.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.6 0.5 1.2 
1954-1958 4.9 -0.1 1.4 0.6 3.0 0.4 3.3 
1959-1975 6.1 0.0 2.4 0.8 2.9 0.5 3.3 
1976-1985 5.3 0.0 2.7 0.7 1.8 0.8 1.8 
1986-2007 1.2 -0.1 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.3 
2008-2013 1.6 0.0 2.4 0.2 -1.0 0.3 -1.1 









Labour Productivity Growth and its Sources, 1850-2019: Two Factors of Production  
 (Annual average logarithmic rates %)     
   Income-based  Education-based 
 GDP per  hour worked Capital Input/hour Labour Quality TFP Labour Quality TFP 
1850-2019 1.9 1.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 
       
1850-1872 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 
1873-1892 1.2 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 
1893-1913 0.6 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
1914-1919 0.1 0.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 
1920-1929 3.5 1.5 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.9 
1930-1935 -1.6 0.6 0.7 -2.9 0.3 -2.5 
1936-1939 -5.9 -0.3 -0.9 -4.7 -0.1 -5.5 
1940-1945 2.1 0.2 -0.2 2.2 -0.2 2.2 
1946-1953 2.1 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.5 1.1 
1954-1958 4.9 1.8 0.6 2.4 0.4 2.7 
1959-1975 6.1 2.7 0.8 2.6 0.5 3.0 
1976-1985 5.3 2.9 0.7 1.7 0.8 1.7 
1986-2007 1.2 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 -0.4 
2008-2013 1.6 2.5 0.2 -1.0 0.3 -1.1 




Table 8    
Labour Productivity in 1990 (2019 EKS US$) and TFP Growth 1990-2019 (%) 
 Output per Hour Worked TFP Growth (%)               TFP Growth (%) 
 1990 1990-2007 1990-2019 
Norway 59 0.7 -0.1 
Belgium 58 0.0 -0.3 
Switzerland 57 -0.2 -0.3 
Netherlands 57 0.3 0.0 
Denmark 56 0.2 0.0 
France 53 0.2 -0.1 
Italy 51 0.1 -0.2 
Germany 48 0.4 0.2 
United States 48 0.7 0.5 
Austria 46 0.2 -0.1 
Spain 45 -0.7 -0.5 
Sweden 43 0.5 0.1 
Canada 42 0.0 -0.1 
Finland 40 1.4 0.5 
Australia 39 -0.2 -0.3 
United Kingdom 39 0.8 0.4 
Ireland 36 1.3 0.6 
Israel 35 -0.2 -0.2 
Singapore 34 0.3 -0.3 
New Zealand 34 0.2 0.1 
Japan 31 -0.5 -0.3 
Greece 31 0.3 -0.5 
Portugal 27 -0.1 -0.3 
Czech Republic 24 0.3 0.1 
Hungary 21 0.8 0.4 
Taiwan 18 2.3 1.8 
Slovak Republic 17 0.5 0.4 
Poland 16 1.0 1.0 
South Korea 12 2.3 1.7 
 
 
























Figure 4. Volume Index of Capital Services* and Productive Capital Stock, (1850=100) (logs) 






Figure 5. Capital Quality (computed with ex-ante exogenous rate of return) (1850=1)  





Figure 6. Capital Deepening* (2010=100) (natural logs x100 level) 











Figure 8. Total Factor Productivity: Estimated with Income- and Education-based Labour 






Figure 9. Total Factor Productivity: Estimated with Three and Two Factors of Production and 




Figure 10. Long Run Trends in Total Factor Productivity: Comparative Estimates (2000=100) 






Figure 11. Total Factor Productivity since 1950: Alternative Estimates (2010=100) (logs) 




Appendix Table A.1 Real GDP and its Composition, 1850-2019 (2010=100) 
     
 
 GDP Population GDP per capita GDP/hour  Hours/Person 
1850 2.0 31.7 6.3 4.5 139.6 
1851 2.0 31.9 6.4 4.6 139.5 
1852 2.1 32.2 6.6 4.7 141.2 
1853 2.2 32.4 6.6 4.8 139.0 
1854 2.2 32.6 6.7 4.8 138.7 
1855 2.3 32.6 7.0 5.1 138.2 
1856 2.2 32.8 6.7 4.8 140.6 
1857 2.2 33.1 6.5 4.6 141.6 
1858 2.2 33.2 6.6 4.7 142.2 
1859 2.3 33.4 6.9 4.9 142.1 
1860 2.4 33.6 7.2 5.1 141.6 
1861 2.4 33.8 7.2 5.0 142.8 
1862 2.5 34.1 7.2 5.1 142.0 
1863 2.5 34.4 7.3 5.1 142.9 
1864 2.5 34.6 7.2 5.1 142.8 
1865 2.4 34.7 6.9 4.8 143.3 
1866 2.6 34.8 7.4 5.2 142.8 
1867 2.5 35.0 7.2 5.0 143.8 
1868 2.2 35.1 6.3 4.4 143.6 
1869 2.3 35.1 6.5 4.6 143.9 
1870 2.4 35.1 6.7 4.7 143.6 
1871 2.6 35.2 7.2 5.0 145.1 
1872 2.9 35.3 8.4 5.8 145.1 
1873 3.2 35.4 9.0 6.1 147.2 
1874 2.9 35.4 8.2 5.7 145.6 
1875 3.0 35.5 8.5 5.8 145.6 
1876 3.1 35.6 8.7 6.0 145.1 
1877 3.5 35.7 9.7 6.6 146.1 
1878 3.3 35.9 9.3 6.4 144.6 
1879 3.1 36.2 8.6 6.0 143.6 
1880 3.4 36.4 9.4 6.5 143.3 
1881 3.5 36.7 9.4 6.6 143.5 
1882 3.5 36.9 9.5 6.6 142.6 
1883 3.6 37.1 9.6 6.8 141.7 
1884 3.6 37.2 9.6 6.9 139.5 
1885 3.5 37.3 9.3 6.7 138.7 
1886 3.4 37.4 9.1 6.6 136.3 
1887 3.3 37.6 8.9 6.5 135.5 
1888 3.5 37.7 9.2 6.8 135.3 
1889 3.5 37.8 9.2 6.8 136.0 
1890 3.5 37.8 9.2 6.7 136.2 
1891 3.5 37.8 9.3 6.8 137.1 
1892 3.8 37.9 10.1 7.4 137.2 
1893 3.7 38.1 9.7 7.0 137.5 
 43 
1894 3.7 38.2 9.8 7.2 136.7 
1895 3.7 38.3 9.6 7.1 136.5 
1896 3.3 38.5 8.7 6.3 136.8 
1897 3.6 38.8 9.2 6.8 134.9 
1898 3.8 39.2 9.8 7.2 136.4 
1899 3.9 39.6 9.8 7.1 137.9 
1900 4.0 39.9 10.0 7.2 137.8 
1901 4.3 40.2 10.7 7.8 137.9 
1902 4.1 40.6 10.2 7.4 137.8 
1903 4.1 41.0 10.1 7.3 137.6 
1904 4.1 41.4 9.9 7.2 137.4 
1905 4.1 41.6 9.8 7.1 137.6 
1906 4.3 41.8 10.3 7.5 137.1 
1907 4.4 42.0 10.5 7.7 136.9 
1908 4.6 42.3 10.9 7.9 136.7 
1909 4.7 42.6 11.1 8.1 136.6 
1910 4.5 42.8 10.5 7.7 136.3 
1911 4.8 43.0 11.3 8.4 134.8 
1912 4.7 43.3 10.8 8.0 135.2 
1913 5.0 43.5 11.4 8.4 135.3 
1914 4.8 44.0 11.0 8.1 135.9 
1915 4.9 44.6 11.1 8.2 135.0 
1916 5.2 45.1 11.4 8.5 134.5 
1917 5.1 45.4 11.2 8.4 134.1 
1918 5.0 45.5 11.1 8.4 132.5 
1919 5.1 45.6 11.3 8.5 132.2 
1920 5.5 45.9 12.1 9.1 132.0 
1921 5.7 46.3 12.4 9.4 131.6 
1922 6.0 46.7 12.8 9.7 131.0 
1923 6.0 47.1 12.8 9.8 130.5 
1924 6.2 47.5 13.1 10.1 130.0 
1925 6.6 47.9 13.9 10.7 129.6 
1926 6.6 48.4 13.6 10.5 129.2 
1927 7.2 48.9 14.7 11.4 128.8 
1928 7.2 49.5 14.5 11.3 128.5 
1929 7.8 50.0 15.5 12.1 128.3 
1930 7.4 50.6 14.6 11.4 128.1 
1931 7.3 51.5 14.1 11.0 128.1 
1932 7.5 52.4 14.3 11.2 128.1 
1933 7.3 53.2 13.7 10.7 128.2 
1934 7.6 54.1 14.1 11.0 128.3 
1935 7.8 54.9 14.2 11.0 128.5 
1936 5.9 55.6 10.7 8.5 126.2 
1937 5.5 55.9 9.9 7.9 125.0 
1938 5.5 56.1 9.8 7.9 124.0 
1939 6.0 55.7 10.7 8.7 123.2 
1940 6.5 55.2 11.8 9.6 122.7 
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1941 6.5 55.1 11.9 9.6 123.3 
1942 7.0 55.1 12.6 10.2 124.1 
1943 7.3 55.4 13.2 10.6 124.8 
1944 7.6 55.9 13.7 10.9 125.6 
1945 7.1 56.5 12.5 9.9 126.4 
1946 7.4 57.0 12.9 10.2 127.2 
1947 7.5 57.6 13.1 10.2 128.1 
1948 7.6 58.5 12.9 10.0 128.9 
1949 7.6 59.5 12.8 9.8 129.8 
1950 7.7 60.1 12.9 9.9 130.7 
1951 8.5 60.5 14.1 10.8 130.1 
1952 9.3 60.9 15.3 11.8 129.5 
1953 9.3 61.4 15.1 11.7 129.0 
1954 10.0 61.9 16.1 12.5 129.1 
1955 10.3 62.3 16.5 12.8 128.6 
1956 11.2 62.8 17.7 13.8 128.5 
1957 11.5 63.4 18.2 14.2 128.3 
1958 12.3 64.0 19.3 15.0 128.5 
1959 12.2 64.6 18.9 15.2 124.7 
1960 12.3 65.4 18.7 15.5 121.1 
1961 13.7 66.1 20.8 17.2 120.8 
1962 15.1 66.7 22.6 18.7 120.9 
1963 16.6 67.3 24.7 20.4 121.1 
1964 17.5 67.9 25.9 21.6 119.6 
1965 19.0 68.6 27.6 22.5 122.6 
1966 20.4 69.5 29.3 24.2 121.4 
1967 21.5 70.4 30.6 25.2 121.4 
1968 22.9 71.3 32.0 27.0 118.6 
1969 25.0 72.1 34.7 29.6 117.0 
1970 25.8 72.8 35.4 30.3 116.9 
1971 27.1 73.5 36.8 31.2 118.0 
1972 29.9 74.3 40.2 34.1 118.0 
1973 32.6 75.1 43.3 36.4 119.2 
1974 35.0 75.9 46.1 39.5 116.9 
1975 36.1 76.8 47.0 42.4 110.8 
1976 37.7 77.6 48.6 45.4 107.2 
1977 39.0 78.4 49.7 47.6 104.5 
1978 40.1 79.2 50.6 51.1 99.0 
1979 40.7 79.9 51.0 53.8 94.7 
1980 42.0 80.5 52.2 58.2 89.7 
1981 42.0 81.1 51.8 60.6 85.5 
1982 42.7 81.6 52.4 62.9 83.3 
1983 43.5 82.0 53.1 65.3 81.3 
1984 43.9 82.3 53.4 69.0 77.3 
1985 45.3 82.6 54.8 72.3 75.8 
1986 47.1 82.8 56.8 73.8 77.0 
1987 50.4 83.1 60.7 75.8 80.1 
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1988 53.6 83.3 64.4 78.0 82.5 
1989 57.1 83.4 68.5 80.8 84.8 
1990 59.8 83.5 71.7 81.4 88.0 
1991 61.8 83.6 73.8 82.6 89.4 
1992 62.7 84.1 74.6 85.3 87.5 
1993 61.8 84.5 73.1 86.6 84.4 
1994 63.5 84.9 74.7 89.3 83.7 
1995 65.8 85.3 77.2 90.9 84.9 
1996 67.6 85.7 78.9 91.9 85.8 
1997 70.2 86.0 81.6 91.9 88.8 
1998 73.5 86.4 85.1 91.7 92.8 
1999 77.0 86.7 88.8 91.6 96.9 
2000 81.0 87.1 93.0 92.1 101.0 
2001 84.2 87.6 96.2 92.2 104.3 
2002 86.5 89.0 97.3 92.4 105.3 
2003 89.2 90.6 98.4 92.7 106.1 
2004 92.0 92.0 99.9 93.0 107.4 
2005 95.3 93.8 101.6 93.4 108.9 
2006 99.1 95.3 104.0 93.8 110.9 
2007 102.7 97.2 105.7 94.9 111.4 
2008 103.7 98.8 105.0 95.2 110.3 
2009 99.9 99.6 100.3 97.5 102.8 
2010 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2011 99.2 100.4 98.8 101.5 97.4 
2012 96.1 100.4 95.7 103.3 92.6 
2013 94.6 100.1 94.6 104.6 90.4 
2014 96.0 99.8 96.3 105.1 91.6 
2015 99.9 99.7 100.2 106.1 94.5 
2016 102.8 99.8 103.0 106.4 96.8 
2017 105.9 99.9 106.0 107.4 98.6 
2018 108.6 100.4 108.2 107.3 100.9 
2019 110.8 101.2 109.5 107.7 101.6 
      
      







Appendix Table A.2 Hours Worked per Person and its Composition, 1850-2019 
(2010=100) 
  
   
 
 Hours per head Hours/FTE worker FTE worker/WAN WAN/Population  
1850 139.6 150.2 103.3 90.0  
1851 139.5 150.0 103.3 90.1  
1852 141.2 151.7 103.3 90.1  
1853 139.0 149.2 103.3 90.2  
1854 138.7 148.7 103.3 90.3  
1855 138.2 148.1 103.3 90.4  
1856 140.6 150.5 103.3 90.4  
1857 141.6 151.4 103.3 90.6  
1858 142.2 151.9 101.6 92.2  
1859 142.1 151.3 101.5 92.5  
1860 141.6 150.4 101.4 92.8  
1861 142.8 151.4 101.7 92.7  
1862 142.0 150.2 102.1 92.7  
1863 142.9 150.7 102.4 92.6  
1864 142.8 150.2 102.8 92.5  
1865 143.3 150.3 103.1 92.4  
1866 142.8 149.4 103.5 92.4  
1867 143.8 150.0 103.8 92.3  
1868 143.6 149.5 104.2 92.2  
1869 143.9 149.3 104.5 92.2  
1870 143.6 148.7 104.9 92.1  
1871 145.1 149.8 105.3 92.0  
1872 145.1 149.5 105.6 91.9  
1873 147.2 151.3 106.0 91.9  
1874 145.6 149.2 106.3 91.8  
1875 145.6 148.8 106.7 91.7  
1876 145.1 147.9 107.1 91.6  
1877 146.1 148.5 107.4 91.6  
1878 144.6 147.8 107.0 91.4  
1879 143.6 147.8 106.4 91.3  
1880 143.3 148.4 105.9 91.2  
1881 143.5 149.6 105.3 91.1  
1882 142.6 149.6 104.8 90.9  
1883 141.7 149.7 104.3 90.8  
1884 139.5 148.3 103.7 90.7  
1885 138.7 148.4 103.2 90.6  
1886 136.3 146.8 102.7 90.4  
1887 135.5 146.8 102.2 90.3  
1888 135.3 146.5 102.3 90.3  
1889 136.0 147.1 102.3 90.3  
1890 136.2 147.2 102.4 90.3  
1891 137.1 148.0 102.5 90.3  
1892 137.2 148.0 102.6 90.3  
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1893 137.5 148.2 102.7 90.3  
1894 136.7 147.2 102.8 90.3  
1895 136.5 146.8 102.9 90.3  
1896 136.8 147.0 103.0 90.3  
1897 134.9 144.8 103.1 90.3  
1898 136.4 146.2 103.2 90.3  
1899 137.9 147.7 103.3 90.3  
1900 137.8 147.5 103.5 90.3  
1901 137.9 147.3 103.8 90.2  
1902 137.8 147.2 103.9 90.1  
1903 137.6 147.0 104.0 90.0  
1904 137.4 146.8 104.2 89.8  
1905 137.6 146.7 104.6 89.7  
1906 137.1 146.5 104.4 89.6  
1907 136.9 146.3 104.6 89.5  
1908 136.7 146.1 104.7 89.3  
1909 136.6 146.0 104.9 89.2  
1910 136.3 145.6 105.0 89.1  
1911 134.8 144.4 104.7 89.2  
1912 135.2 145.0 104.4 89.4  
1913 135.3 145.3 104.0 89.5  
1914 135.9 146.2 103.7 89.6  
1915 135.0 145.4 103.4 89.7  
1916 134.5 145.0 103.2 89.9  
1917 134.1 144.8 102.9 90.0  
1918 132.5 143.2 102.6 90.1  
1919 132.2 143.1 102.4 90.3  
1920 132.0 143.0 102.1 90.4  
1921 131.6 142.4 102.2 90.5  
1922 131.0 141.7 102.1 90.6  
1923 130.5 141.1 102.0 90.6  
1924 130.0 140.4 102.0 90.7  
1925 129.6 139.8 102.0 90.8  
1926 129.2 139.1 102.1 90.9  
1927 128.8 138.5 102.2 91.0  
1928 128.5 137.9 102.3 91.1  
1929 128.3 137.3 102.5 91.2  
1930 128.1 136.6 102.7 91.3  
1931 128.1 136.2 102.8 91.5  
1932 128.1 135.6 103.1 91.7  
1933 128.2 135.1 103.3 91.9  
1934 128.3 134.5 103.6 92.1  
1935 128.5 133.9 104.0 92.3  
1936 126.2 133.2 102.4 92.5  
1937 125.0 133.5 101.1 92.7  
1938 124.0 133.7 99.9 92.9  
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1939 123.2 134.0 98.8 93.1  
1940 122.7 134.3 97.9 93.3  
1941 123.3 134.3 98.0 93.7  
1942 124.1 134.3 98.1 94.2  
1943 124.8 134.2 98.3 94.6  
1944 125.6 134.2 98.5 95.0  
1945 126.4 134.2 98.7 95.5  
1946 127.2 134.2 98.9 95.9  
1947 128.1 134.2 99.1 96.4  
1948 128.9 134.2 99.3 96.8  
1949 129.8 134.1 99.5 97.2  
1950 130.7 134.1 99.8 97.7  
1951 130.1 133.8 99.9 97.3  
1952 129.5 133.5 100.0 97.0  
1953 129.0 133.3 100.2 96.7  
1954 129.1 133.5 100.4 96.3  
1955 128.6 132.4 101.2 96.0  
1956 128.5 131.3 102.3 95.7  
1957 128.3 130.2 103.3 95.3  
1958 128.5 129.2 104.6 95.0  
1959 124.7 128.2 102.7 94.7  
1960 121.1 127.3 100.4 94.7  
1961 120.8 126.4 101.2 94.4  
1962 120.9 125.5 102.3 94.1  
1963 121.1 124.6 103.6 93.8  
1964 119.6 123.4 104.2 93.1  
1965 122.6 122.9 107.6 92.8  
1966 121.4 123.0 106.8 92.4  
1967 121.4 123.5 106.9 91.9  
1968 118.6 121.2 106.9 91.5  
1969 117.0 120.7 106.1 91.3  
1970 116.9 121.2 105.9 91.2  
1971 118.0 121.8 105.5 91.8  
1972 118.0 120.7 106.6 91.7  
1973 119.2 120.0 108.4 91.7  
1974 116.9 118.6 107.6 91.6  
1975 110.8 116.6 103.8 91.6  
1976 107.2 114.5 102.2 91.6  
1977 104.5 112.6 101.3 91.6  
1978 99.0 110.4 97.8 91.7  
1979 94.7 108.3 95.1 92.0  
1980 89.7 107.3 90.5 92.4  
1981 85.5 105.6 87.2 92.8  
1982 83.3 104.4 85.5 93.4  
1983 81.3 102.6 84.3 94.0  
1984 77.3 100.3 81.5 94.5  
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1985 75.8 99.7 80.0 95.1  
1986 77.0 99.2 81.2 95.6  
1987 80.1 98.6 84.6 96.1  
1988 82.5 98.3 87.0 96.6  
1989 84.8 97.4 89.6 97.1  
1990 88.0 97.4 92.5 97.7  
1991 89.4 97.8 93.0 98.3  
1992 87.5 97.4 90.8 98.9  
1993 84.4 97.1 87.4 99.4  
1994 83.7 97.1 86.3 99.9  
1995 84.9 96.9 87.4 100.3  
1996 85.8 97.2 87.9 100.5  
1997 88.8 97.5 90.4 100.7  
1998 92.8 98.1 93.8 100.8  
1999 96.9 98.3 97.7 100.9  
2000 101.0 98.2 102.0 100.8  
2001 104.3 98.7 105.0 100.6  
2002 105.3 99.0 105.6 100.7  
2003 106.1 99.1 106.2 100.8  
2004 107.4 99.3 107.0 101.1  
2005 108.9 99.1 108.4 101.3  
2006 110.9 99.1 110.6 101.1  
2007 111.4 98.6 111.7 101.3  
2008 110.3 99.2 110.0 101.1  
2009 102.8 99.5 102.7 100.6  
2010 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
2011 97.4 100.5 97.4 99.4  
2012 92.6 100.7 93.0 98.9  
2013 90.4 101.2 90.8 98.3  
2014 91.6 101.3 92.5 97.7  
2015 94.5 101.2 95.9 97.3  
2016 96.8 101.0 98.8 97.0  
2017 98.6 100.2 101.7 96.8  
2018 100.9 100.3 104.0 96.7  
2019 101.6 99.5 105.5 96.7  
      
      






Appendix Table A.3 Labour Input and its Composition, 1850-2019 (2010=100) 
  Income-based  Education-based  
 
Labour Quantity Labour Quality Labour Input Labour Quality 
Labour 
Input 
1850 44.2 55.7 24.6 49.9 22.1 
1851 44.5 55.7 24.8 49.9 22.2 
1852 45.4 55.7 25.3 50.0 22.7 
1853 45.0 55.7 25.1 50.1 22.5 
1854 45.2 55.8 25.2 50.1 22.7 
1855 45.0 55.8 25.1 50.2 22.6 
1856 46.1 55.8 25.7 50.3 23.2 
1857 46.9 55.8 26.2 50.3 23.6 
1858 47.2 55.8 26.3 50.4 23.8 
1859 47.4 55.8 26.4 50.5 23.9 
1860 47.5 55.9 26.5 50.6 24.0 
1861 48.3 56.0 27.0 50.6 24.5 
1862 48.5 56.2 27.3 50.7 24.6 
1863 49.1 56.3 27.7 50.8 24.9 
1864 49.4 56.5 27.9 50.8 25.1 
1865 49.7 56.6 28.1 50.9 25.3 
1866 49.7 56.7 28.2 51.0 25.3 
1867 50.4 56.9 28.7 51.0 25.7 
1868 50.4 57.1 28.8 51.1 25.8 
1869 50.5 57.2 28.9 51.2 25.8 
1870 50.4 57.4 28.9 51.2 25.8 
1871 51.1 57.4 29.3 51.3 26.2 
1872 51.2 57.6 29.5 51.7 26.5 
1873 52.1 57.7 30.0 51.8 27.0 
1874 51.6 57.8 29.8 51.9 26.8 
1875 51.7 57.9 30.0 52.0 26.9 
1876 51.7 58.2 30.0 52.1 26.9 
1877 52.2 58.2 30.4 52.5 27.4 
1878 52.0 58.1 30.2 52.6 27.3 
1879 52.0 58.1 30.2 52.8 27.4 
1880 52.2 58.2 30.4 53.0 27.7 
1881 52.7 58.3 30.7 53.2 28.0 
1882 52.7 58.3 30.7 53.4 28.1 
1883 52.6 58.3 30.6 53.7 28.2 
1884 51.9 58.0 30.1 53.9 28.0 
1885 51.8 58.0 30.0 54.1 28.0 
1886 51.0 57.9 29.5 54.3 27.7 
1887 51.0 57.8 29.5 54.5 27.8 
1888 51.0 57.8 29.5 54.7 27.9 
1889 51.4 58.0 29.8 54.8 28.2 
1890 51.5 58.1 29.9 55.0 28.3 
1891 51.8 58.3 30.2 55.1 28.6 
1892 52.0 58.3 30.4 55.2 28.7 
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1893 52.3 58.5 30.6 55.3 29.0 
1894 52.2 58.4 30.5 55.4 28.9 
1895 52.3 58.5 30.6 55.4 29.0 
1896 52.7 58.6 30.9 55.5 29.2 
1897 52.4 58.5 30.6 55.5 29.1 
1898 53.5 58.8 31.4 55.6 29.7 
1899 54.6 59.1 32.3 55.6 30.3 
1900 55.0 58.7 32.3 55.6 30.6 
1901 55.4 58.8 32.6 55.6 30.8 
1902 55.9 58.9 32.9 55.7 31.1 
1903 56.4 59.1 33.3 55.7 31.4 
1904 56.9 59.2 33.6 55.7 31.7 
1905 57.3 59.3 34.0 55.7 31.9 
1906 57.3 59.4 34.0 55.7 32.0 
1907 57.6 59.5 34.2 55.8 32.1 
1908 57.8 59.6 34.5 55.8 32.3 
1909 58.1 59.7 34.7 55.8 32.4 
1910 58.4 59.7 34.8 55.8 32.6 
1911 58.0 59.6 34.6 55.8 32.4 
1912 58.5 60.1 35.2 55.8 32.6 
1913 58.9 60.5 35.6 55.7 32.8 
1914 59.8 61.2 36.6 55.6 33.3 
1915 60.1 61.2 36.8 55.6 33.4 
1916 60.6 61.3 37.1 55.5 33.6 
1917 60.9 61.4 37.4 55.4 33.7 
1918 60.3 61.3 36.9 55.3 33.4 
1919 60.3 61.2 36.9 55.2 33.3 
1920 60.6 61.4 37.2 55.2 33.4 
1921 60.9 61.9 37.7 55.2 33.6 
1922 61.2 62.4 38.2 55.2 33.8 
1923 61.5 62.8 38.6 55.2 34.0 
1924 61.7 63.3 39.1 55.3 34.1 
1925 62.0 63.8 39.6 55.5 34.4 
1926 62.5 64.3 40.2 55.6 34.7 
1927 63.0 64.7 40.8 55.8 35.2 
1928 63.6 65.2 41.4 56.0 35.6 
1929 64.1 65.7 42.1 56.2 36.0 
1930 64.9 66.1 42.9 56.4 36.6 
1931 65.9 66.8 44.0 56.6 37.3 
1932 67.1 67.5 45.3 56.9 38.1 
1933 68.3 68.2 46.6 57.2 39.0 
1934 69.4 69.0 47.9 57.5 39.9 
1935 70.5 69.7 49.1 57.9 40.8 
1936 70.1 69.0 48.4 58.1 40.8 
1937 69.9 68.1 47.6 58.2 40.7 
1938 69.6 67.3 46.8 58.0 40.4 
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1939 68.6 66.4 45.6 57.7 39.6 
1940 67.7 65.5 44.4 57.3 38.8 
1941 68.0 65.4 44.5 56.9 38.7 
1942 68.3 65.4 44.6 56.7 38.7 
1943 69.2 65.3 45.1 56.5 39.1 
1944 70.3 65.2 45.8 56.5 39.7 
1945 71.4 65.1 46.5 56.4 40.3 
1946 72.6 65.0 47.2 56.6 41.1 
1947 73.8 64.9 47.9 56.9 42.0 
1948 75.5 64.8 48.9 57.4 43.3 
1949 77.3 64.8 50.0 58.1 44.9 
1950 78.6 64.7 50.8 58.8 46.2 
1951 78.7 64.8 51.0 59.4 46.8 
1952 78.8 65.3 51.5 59.9 47.3 
1953 79.2 65.8 52.1 60.4 47.8 
1954 79.9 66.3 52.9 60.7 48.5 
1955 80.2 66.8 53.6 61.1 49.0 
1956 80.8 67.7 54.6 61.5 49.6 
1957 81.3 68.4 55.6 61.8 50.3 
1958 82.2 69.1 56.8 62.2 51.1 
1959 80.6 69.2 55.8 62.6 50.5 
1960 79.1 69.5 55.0 63.0 49.9 
1961 79.9 70.3 56.1 63.5 50.7 
1962 80.6 71.2 57.4 63.9 51.5 
1963 81.5 72.0 58.7 64.3 52.4 
1964 81.2 74.1 60.2 64.8 52.6 
1965 84.2 75.1 63.2 65.2 54.9 
1966 84.4 75.2 63.5 65.7 55.4 
1967 85.5 76.3 65.3 66.2 56.6 
1968 84.6 77.4 65.4 66.7 56.4 
1969 84.3 78.4 66.1 67.1 56.6 
1970 85.1 79.5 67.6 67.6 57.5 
1971 86.7 80.5 69.8 68.1 59.0 
1972 87.7 81.7 71.6 68.4 60.0 
1973 89.6 82.6 74.0 68.9 61.7 
1974 88.8 83.7 74.3 69.3 61.6 
1975 85.0 85.5 72.7 69.8 59.4 
1976 83.1 86.9 72.3 70.4 58.5 
1977 81.9 88.2 72.2 71.0 58.2 
1978 78.4 89.1 69.8 71.7 56.2 
1979 75.7 90.2 68.2 72.5 54.9 
1980 72.2 91.1 65.8 73.4 53.0 
1981 69.4 92.2 63.9 74.3 51.6 
1982 68.0 93.0 63.2 75.4 51.2 
1983 66.6 93.7 62.4 76.4 50.9 
1984 63.6 94.4 60.1 77.5 49.3 
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1985 62.6 95.2 59.6 78.6 49.2 
1986 63.8 96.0 61.3 79.7 50.8 
1987 66.5 96.2 64.0 80.7 53.7 
1988 68.7 96.5 66.3 81.5 56.0 
1989 70.7 97.2 68.7 82.3 58.2 
1990 73.4 97.7 71.7 83.2 61.1 
1991 74.7 98.2 73.4 84.2 62.9 
1992 73.5 98.4 72.4 85.2 62.7 
1993 71.3 98.4 70.1 85.9 61.3 
1994 71.1 98.4 69.9 86.7 61.6 
1995 72.4 98.5 71.3 87.5 63.4 
1996 73.5 98.5 72.5 88.3 65.0 
1997 76.4 98.8 75.5 89.2 68.1 
1998 80.1 98.8 79.2 89.8 72.0 
1999 84.0 99.0 83.2 90.5 76.0 
2000 88.0 98.9 87.0 91.1 80.2 
2001 91.3 98.6 90.0 92.6 84.5 
2002 93.7 98.6 92.3 94.1 88.2 
2003 96.2 98.5 94.7 95.7 92.0 
2004 98.9 98.6 97.4 97.4 96.3 
2005 102.1 98.7 100.8 99.1 101.1 
2006 105.7 98.9 104.5 99.3 104.9 
2007 108.3 98.7 106.9 99.4 107.7 
2008 108.9 99.1 108.0 99.6 108.5 
2009 102.4 99.8 102.2 99.8 102.2 
2010 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2011 97.7 100.2 98.0 101.2 98.9 
2012 93.1 100.3 93.4 101.5 94.4 
2013 90.4 100.3 90.7 102.5 92.7 
2014 91.4 100.2 91.6 103.6 94.6 
2015 94.2 99.9 94.1 105.5 99.3 
2016 96.6 99.9 96.5 107.0 103.4 
2017 98.6 99.8 98.4 107.7 106.2 
2018 101.2 99.8 101.0 108.4 109.7 
2019 102.8 99.8 102.6 109.1 112.1 
      
      




Appendix Table A.4 GDP per Hour Worked and its Sources, 1850-2019 (2010=100)   









Quality TFP  
1850 4.5 0.6 171.3 55.7 32.5 49.9 34.5 
1851 4.6 0.6 170.6 55.7 32.8 49.9 34.8 
1852 4.7 0.6 167.8 55.7 33.7 50.0 35.8 
1853 4.8 0.6 169.7 55.7 34.0 50.1 36.1 
1854 4.8 0.6 169.4 55.8 34.3 50.1 36.4 
1855 5.1 0.7 170.7 55.8 36.0 50.2 38.1 
1856 4.8 0.6 167.2 55.8 33.8 50.3 35.8 
1857 4.6 0.7 164.7 55.8 32.5 50.3 34.4 
1858 4.7 0.7 164.2 55.8 32.7 50.4 34.6 
1859 4.9 0.7 164.0 55.8 33.8 50.5 35.7 
1860 5.1 0.8 164.1 55.9 34.7 50.6 36.6 
1861 5.0 0.8 160.9 56.0 34.1 50.6 36.0 
1862 5.1 0.8 160.0 56.2 33.8 50.7 35.7 
1863 5.1 0.9 157.5 56.3 33.6 50.8 35.6 
1864 5.1 0.9 156.4 56.5 33.0 50.8 35.0 
1865 4.8 0.9 155.0 56.6 31.3 50.9 33.2 
1866 5.2 1.0 154.5 56.7 33.0 51.0 35.0 
1867 5.0 1.0 152.2 56.9 32.1 51.0 34.1 
1868 4.4 1.0 151.7 57.1 27.9 51.1 29.7 
1869 4.6 1.0 151.1 57.2 28.9 51.2 30.8 
1870 4.7 1.0 150.9 57.4 29.7 51.2 31.7 
1871 5.0 1.0 148.6 57.4 31.7 51.3 33.8 
1872 5.8 1.0 147.8 57.6 36.4 51.7 38.7 
1873 6.1 1.0 145.0 57.7 39.0 51.8 41.4 
1874 5.7 1.0 146.0 57.8 35.8 51.9 38.0 
1875 5.8 1.0 145.4 57.9 36.6 52.0 38.9 
1876 6.0 1.0 145.1 58.2 37.6 52.1 40.0 
1877 6.6 1.0 143.3 58.2 41.3 52.5 43.8 
1878 6.4 1.0 143.6 58.1 39.7 52.6 41.9 
1879 6.0 1.1 143.2 58.1 36.8 52.8 38.8 
1880 6.5 1.1 142.2 58.2 39.9 53.0 42.0 
1881 6.6 1.1 140.6 58.3 39.9 53.2 41.9 
1882 6.6 1.2 140.3 58.3 40.0 53.4 41.9 
1883 6.8 1.2 140.2 58.3 40.2 53.7 42.0 
1884 6.9 1.3 141.6 58.0 40.2 53.9 41.8 
1885 6.7 1.3 141.7 58.0 38.5 54.1 40.0 
1886 6.6 1.4 143.4 57.9 37.9 54.3 39.2 
1887 6.5 1.4 143.2 57.8 37.2 54.5 38.3 
1888 6.8 1.4 142.6 57.8 38.6 54.7 39.8 
1889 6.8 1.4 141.4 58.0 38.3 54.8 39.4 
1890 6.7 1.4 140.8 58.1 37.9 55.0 39.0 
1891 6.8 1.5 142.9 58.3 38.1 55.1 39.2 
1892 7.4 1.5 147.5 58.3 41.1 55.2 42.3 
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1893 7.0 1.5 146.7 58.5 39.1 55.3 40.3 
1894 7.2 1.5 146.9 58.4 39.7 55.4 40.8 
1895 7.1 1.5 145.2 58.5 39.0 55.4 40.1 
1896 6.3 1.5 146.7 58.6 34.9 55.5 35.9 
1897 6.8 1.5 157.1 58.5 37.3 55.5 38.2 
1898 7.2 1.5 156.1 58.8 39.2 55.6 40.3 
1899 7.1 1.5 151.9 59.1 38.6 55.6 39.9 
1900 7.2 1.6 150.5 58.7 38.6 55.6 39.7 
1901 7.8 1.7 150.5 58.8 40.9 55.6 42.1 
1902 7.4 1.7 151.8 58.9 38.6 55.7 39.8 
1903 7.3 1.7 150.8 59.1 38.2 55.7 39.4 
1904 7.2 1.8 150.5 59.2 37.3 55.7 38.5 
1905 7.1 1.8 150.7 59.3 36.5 55.7 37.7 
1906 7.5 1.8 154.6 59.4 38.4 55.7 39.6 
1907 7.7 1.9 154.8 59.5 38.8 55.8 40.1 
1908 7.9 1.9 155.9 59.6 39.7 55.8 41.1 
1909 8.1 1.9 156.5 59.7 40.4 55.8 41.8 
1910 7.7 2.0 156.1 59.7 38.1 55.8 39.5 
1911 8.4 2.0 158.1 59.6 40.9 55.8 42.4 
1912 8.0 2.1 155.8 60.1 38.8 55.8 40.4 
1913 8.4 2.1 156.2 60.5 40.2 55.7 42.0 
1914 8.1 2.2 152.9 61.2 38.3 55.6 40.2 
1915 8.2 2.2 154.1 61.2 38.6 55.6 40.6 
1916 8.5 2.2 153.9 61.3 40.1 55.5 42.3 
1917 8.4 2.2 154.1 61.4 39.2 55.4 41.4 
1918 8.4 2.3 157.2 61.3 38.6 55.3 40.8 
1919 8.5 2.3 158.3 61.2 38.9 55.2 41.0 
1920 9.1 2.4 157.7 61.4 41.3 55.2 43.7 
1921 9.4 2.5 157.9 61.9 41.8 55.2 44.4 
1922 9.7 2.6 155.0 62.4 42.8 55.2 45.7 
1923 9.8 2.6 156.7 62.8 42.6 55.2 45.6 
1924 10.1 2.7 156.1 63.3 43.1 55.3 46.4 
1925 10.7 2.8 157.3 63.8 45.1 55.5 48.7 
1926 10.5 2.9 157.1 64.3 43.7 55.6 47.3 
1927 11.4 3.0 156.9 64.7 46.7 55.8 50.6 
1928 11.3 3.2 155.6 65.2 45.2 56.0 49.1 
1929 12.1 3.4 155.3 65.7 47.1 56.2 51.3 
1930 11.4 3.6 156.3 66.1 43.3 56.4 47.2 
1931 11.0 3.7 155.4 66.8 41.1 56.6 45.1 
1932 11.2 3.7 152.5 67.5 41.6 56.9 45.8 
1933 10.7 3.7 149.1 68.2 39.6 57.2 43.7 
1934 11.0 3.7 148.0 69.0 40.2 57.5 44.5 
1935 11.0 3.7 145.2 69.7 40.1 57.9 44.6 
1936 8.5 3.8 143.6 69.0 31.0 58.1 34.1 
1937 7.9 3.7 141.8 68.1 29.3 58.2 31.9 
1938 7.9 3.6 140.6 67.3 29.8 58.0 32.2 
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1939 8.7 3.5 140.7 66.4 33.2 57.7 35.8 
1940 9.6 3.5 145.8 65.5 37.1 57.3 39.7 
1941 9.6 3.6 148.1 65.4 37.0 56.9 39.8 
1942 10.2 3.6 147.5 65.4 38.9 56.7 41.9 
1943 10.6 3.7 144.2 65.3 40.4 56.5 43.6 
1944 10.9 3.7 143.4 65.2 41.7 56.5 44.9 
1945 9.9 3.6 140.7 65.1 38.0 56.4 40.9 
1946 10.2 3.6 139.8 65.0 39.1 56.6 42.0 
1947 10.2 3.6 138.1 64.9 39.3 56.9 42.0 
1948 10.0 3.7 136.2 64.8 38.6 57.4 41.0 
1949 9.8 3.7 134.2 64.8 37.8 58.1 39.9 
1950 9.9 3.7 132.6 64.7 37.8 58.8 39.5 
1951 10.8 3.8 133.6 64.8 41.1 59.4 42.8 
1952 11.8 3.9 133.7 65.3 44.1 59.9 45.9 
1953 11.7 4.0 132.4 65.8 43.3 60.4 45.0 
1954 12.5 4.2 130.7 66.3 45.4 60.7 47.2 
1955 12.8 4.3 130.1 66.8 45.9 61.1 47.9 
1956 13.8 4.6 129.5 67.7 48.3 61.5 50.6 
1957 14.2 4.9 128.6 68.4 48.6 61.8 51.1 
1958 15.0 5.3 127.5 69.1 50.3 62.2 53.0 
1959 15.2 5.7 128.9 69.2 49.9 62.6 52.4 
1960 15.5 6.1 131.1 69.5 49.9 63.0 52.3 
1961 17.2 6.4 130.7 70.3 54.5 63.5 57.2 
1962 18.7 6.7 129.7 71.2 58.0 63.9 61.2 
1963 20.4 7.1 128.6 72.0 61.8 64.3 65.4 
1964 21.6 7.7 127.3 74.1 62.7 64.8 67.4 
1965 22.5 8.1 122.3 75.1 63.9 65.2 68.9 
1966 24.2 9.0 121.3 75.2 66.5 65.7 71.4 
1967 25.2 9.8 119.2 76.3 66.9 66.2 72.2 
1968 27.0 11.0 120.2 77.4 68.7 66.7 74.5 
1969 29.6 12.3 120.3 78.4 72.3 67.1 78.7 
1970 30.3 13.4 120.1 79.5 71.2 67.6 77.9 
1971 31.2 14.2 123.0 80.5 71.3 68.1 78.3 
1972 34.1 15.3 121.9 81.7 75.4 68.4 83.2 
1973 36.4 16.4 118.7 82.6 78.0 68.9 86.5 
1974 39.5 18.3 119.5 83.7 81.1 69.3 90.2 
1975 42.4 20.9 124.7 85.5 82.2 69.8 92.3 
1976 45.4 23.1 126.3 86.9 84.3 70.4 95.2 
1977 47.6 25.1 128.6 88.2 85.2 71.0 96.6 
1978 51.1 27.9 134.3 89.1 87.8 71.7 99.5 
1979 53.8 30.6 139.2 90.2 89.1 72.5 101.1 
1980 58.2 33.7 145.8 91.1 92.7 73.4 105.0 
1981 60.6 36.9 151.9 92.2 92.8 74.3 105.1 
1982 62.9 39.4 155.8 93.0 93.6 75.4 105.7 
1983 65.3 41.9 158.9 93.7 94.7 76.4 106.5 
1984 69.0 45.6 167.0 94.4 96.6 77.5 108.2 
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1985 72.3 47.9 169.1 95.2 98.7 78.6 110.2 
1986 73.8 48.9 166.2 96.0 99.5 79.7 110.7 
1987 75.8 49.1 159.6 96.2 101.9 80.7 112.8 
1988 78.0 50.3 154.6 96.5 103.9 81.5 114.5 
1989 80.8 52.1 150.4 97.2 105.7 82.3 116.2 
1990 81.4 53.6 143.8 97.7 105.2 83.2 115.3 
1991 82.6 56.0 139.9 98.2 104.7 84.2 114.3 
1992 85.3 60.0 141.6 98.4 105.1 85.2 114.1 
1993 86.6 64.3 144.5 98.4 103.9 85.9 112.2 
1994 89.3 66.6 140.8 98.4 105.7 86.7 113.5 
1995 90.9 67.8 139.8 98.5 106.9 87.5 114.2 
1996 91.9 69.5 139.0 98.5 107.0 88.3 113.8 
1997 91.9 69.7 132.9 98.8 106.8 89.2 113.1 
1998 91.7 69.5 126.3 98.8 106.9 89.8 112.7 
1999 91.6 69.6 120.1 99.0 106.7 90.5 112.2 
2000 92.1 70.1 114.9 98.9 107.1 91.1 112.1 
2001 92.2 71.2 110.4 98.6 106.9 92.6 110.7 
2002 92.4 72.9 107.2 98.6 106.2 94.1 108.9 
2003 92.7 74.5 103.5 98.5 105.7 95.7 107.4 
2004 93.0 76.1 99.6 98.6 105.1 97.4 105.8 
2005 93.4 77.7 96.8 98.7 104.6 99.1 104.4 
2006 93.8 79.4 93.7 98.9 104.1 99.3 103.8 
2007 94.9 82.2 92.5 98.7 103.8 99.4 103.4 
2008 95.2 86.2 92.6 99.1 101.8 99.6 101.5 
2009 97.5 95.3 98.1 99.8 99.6 99.8 99.6 
2010 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2011 101.5 104.4 102.9 100.2 99.5 101.2 99.0 
2012 103.3 111.4 108.0 100.3 98.4 101.5 97.7 
2013 104.6 115.8 111.4 100.3 98.0 102.5 96.8 
2014 105.1 115.6 110.5 100.2 98.5 103.6 96.8 
2015 106.1 113.5 107.6 99.9 100.4 105.5 97.5 
2016 106.4 112.2 105.3 99.9 101.3 107.0 97.6 
2017 107.4 111.8 104.3 99.8 102.6 107.7 98.4 
2018 107.3 111.0 102.4 99.8 102.8 108.4 98.3 
2019 107.7 111.8 101.2 99.8 102.9 109.1 98.1 
 
 
Sources: See the text 
